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Use of Evidenee of Refusal
South Dakota v. Neville
The scope of the Fifth Amendment pri-
vilege against self-incrimination was
examined in this drunk driver case and
the U.S. Suprerne Court held
that the admission into
evidence of a defendant's
refusal to subrnit to...a
[blood alcoirol] test. . .does
not offend the right against
self-incrimination. South
Dakota v. Nevill-e, 32 CrL
3047 (1983)
The defendant was arrested for driving
$hile intoxicated and read the standard
Miranda rights. He was asked to subnit
toTEood-alcohol test and warned that
he could lose his l-icense if he refuSed.
Nevllle refused to tal<e the test, stat-
ing "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the
test." The defendant was asked to take
the test two additional times and re-
fused, again saying he was too drunk to
pass it.
State law specifically allorvs a re-
fusal to be adnitted into evidence, how-
ever, the trial court granted a rmtion
to suppress the refusal and the South
Dakota Suprere Court affirmed on the
grounds that the statute which allows
the introduction of this evidence vio-
Iated the Fifth Amendment privi lege
against self-incrimination.
Justice O'Connor first discussed the
1966 case of Schmerber v. California, 3eA
u.i. zsz, and-sail--ffiat trre court-Ead
held that the privilege bars the state
only fron connpelling 'rcdrmunications" or
"testinony." Since a blooci test was
"physical or real" evidence rather than
testirnonial e-vidence, we found it u:rpro-
tected by the Fifth Ane.ndnent privilege.
South Dakota v. Neville, supra. at 3A49.
Ttre Court went on to saY that
the Fifth Amendnent is limited
to prohibiting the use of
"physical or npral ccrnpulsion"
exerted on tfre Person asserting
the privilege.
Quoting Fisher v. U'.S., 425 U.S. 39I , 397
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(1976). I'levilf9, at 3048
In this case the state gives the de-
fendant the choice of submitting to a
safe, painless and conrnonplace blood-
alcohol- test or refusing the test and
having that fact admitted into evidence
against him. lVhile the presence of a
choice alone does not resolve the ques-
tion of conpulsion, in this contexl, the
choice, while dif f icult , i-s clearly legi-
ti.mate. Since under Schmerber the state
could cornpel the suspect-to take the
test, offering the option of refusal with
its penalties, is no less legitimate.
tA] refusal to take a blood-
alcohol test, after a Police
officer has lawfully requested
it, is not an act coerced bY
the officer, and thus is not
protected by the Privilege
against self-incrimination.
Neville at 3049.
Nor is Miranda applicable in this type
of situation. In footnote 15 of the
majority oplnion the Court saYs
In the context of an arrest for
driving wtrile intoxicated, a
police inquiry of whether the
suspect will take a blood-
alcohol test is not an interro-
gation within the meaning of
IUiranda. ...Police words or
act6ns normallY attendant to
arrest and custodY do not con-
stitute interrogation. The
police inquiry here is highlY
regulated by state 1aw, and is
presented in virtuallY the sane
words to all susPects. It is
similar to a Police request to
sutxnit to fingerPrinting or
photography. ResPondent's
choice of refusal thus enjoYs
no proPhylactic Miranda Pre
tection outside the basic Fifth
Amendnent Protection. South
Dakota v. Neville, 32 CrL 3U7,
n:-15-
Finally the court disposes of the de-
fendant's contention that the use of his
refusal violates the Dre Process clause
because he was not warned of the parti-
cular evidentiary consequence of refusal.
The warnin_gs given Neville_ by South
Dakota police officers included the
suspect's right'to refuse; his right
to have a test given by scrneone of his
own choosing, at his own expense, and
the fact that his driving privilege could
be revoked for one year if he refused to
sutxnit to the offered test. The right to
silence underlying the Miranda wannings
is one of constitutional dimension and
thus silence cannot be used against a
suspect u,ho exercises that ccjnstitutional
right. The warnings challenged here are
not of constitutional dimension but one
of legislative grace. Ttre court held
that such a failure to warn
was not the sort of implicit
pranise to forego use of evi-
dence that wculd unfairly
"trick" respondent if the evi-
dence were later offered against
hirn at trial. lTe therefore con-
clude that the use of evidence
of refusal after these warnings
ccrnported with the fundar,rental
fairness required by Dre ProcesS.
Neville at 3050.
Ttre South Dakota Suprene Court was
reversed.
South Dakota v. Neville is an important
case in nffi-n-'s-att,flt to control the
"carnage caused by drrrnk drivers". Along
with Schmerber, it gives the states the
authoffito use their "implied consent"
laws in these type cases to the fullest
extent. Driving privileges may be revoked
for failure to consent to chernical testinB
and the refusal itself rnay be introduced as
an evidentiary fact to be considered by the
trial court. Since the request and refusal
is outside t'he ambit of the Fifth Anendnent,
law enforcernent officers do not have to be
concerned with lvliranda, ffid the use of the
fact of refusal-does not violate the fun-
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